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Supranational Creditors: A Threat to the Equal 
Status of Bondholders? 
 
Annamaria Viterbo 






Sovereign bonds are actively traded in secondary markets and held by a broad 
community of creditors. The current profile of sovereign bondholders includes retail 
and institutional investors (banks, investment funds, pension funds, and insurance 
companies), also encompassing sovereign wealth funds, central banks, the IMF and 
similar organizations, as well as institutions like the ECB and the EIB. Bondholders 
have become increasingly diverse, numerous, anonymous and difficult to coordinate. To 
further complicate a common course of action, they might have conflicting interests, 
different drives and bargaining power, as well as significant information asymmetries. 
The fragmentation of the bondholders’ profile poses a host of complex issues to the 
development of a dedicated workout mechanism for the restructuring of sovereign bond 
debt. In particular, the challenges raised by ‘supranational creditors’ are yet to be 
carefully addressed. This term is used to describe international organizations (like the 
IMF and the IBRD) and supranational institutions (like the ECB) when they purchase 
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sovereign bonds on the secondary market. These atypical sovereign bond investors are 
halfway between private retail investors and multilaterals providing financial assistance 
and they might pursue objectives other than mere profit. 
The paper addresses the question whether, in a debt restructuring, supranational 
creditors should be treated equally to other bondholders or should be given priority.  
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1. Recent developments in the profile of bond investors: the issue of supranational 
bondholders 
 Sovereign debt, either external or domestic1, is the debt issued or guaranteed by the 
central government of a State.2  
States can borrow from a variety of sources. They can receive loans from 
international financial institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank 
and regional development banks), foreign governments and commercial banks (either 
individually or as part of a syndicate), or they can issue sovereign bonds on the 
international capital markets. 
In the 19th century and in the early years of the 20th century, most sovereign debt 
was in the form of bonds or loans disbursed by private banks (which granted mainly 
                                                
1 While a State’s domestic debt is usually governed by its national law, subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of national courts, denominated in domestic currency and predominantly held by residents, 
the external debt is traditionally governed by a foreign law, subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign court 
and denominated in foreign currency. 
2 Recently, also the issue of the so-called ‘quasi-sovereign debt’ has been raised, which refers to the 
debt incurred by subnational political entities (provinces, municipalities and the like), and by State-owned 
enterprises. While State-owned enterprises are usually able to borrow externally even when the 
government does not guarantee its repayment, in some cases the administrative regions of sovereign 
States are prohibited by law to do so (for example, in the United Kingdom, but not in the United States). 
The global financial crisis highlighted the problems related to the debt owned by public enterprises, 
which in some cases was restructured on the same basis as sovereign debt, while in others was dealt with 
through the relevant domestic bankruptcy regime. See U Das, M Papaioannou, C Trebesch, ‘Sovereign 
Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts’ (2012) IMF Working Paper, 
WP/12/203, 56 ff. and A Gelpern, ‘Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt’ 
(2012) Yale Law Journal 121, 888-942. 
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short-term trade financing or interbank credit lines). To deal with sovereign defaults, 
bondholders’ committees3 were established and, occasionally, western powers even 
engaged in gunboat diplomacy to recover debts owed to their nationals.  
After World War II, government-to-government loans became the preeminent form 
of borrowing and sovereign debt restructurings were dealt with by the Paris Club. 
It was only in the 1970s that States started to borrow from international commercial 
banks through long-term syndicated credit agreements.4 During the 1980s, however, the 
majority of emerging countries defaulted on their bank loans, which had to be 
restructured by small creditor banks’ committees collectively referred to as the London 
Club.  
During the 1990s, bank lending to emerging economies declined as compared to 
sovereign bond financing and nowadays the external debt of sovereigns is mainly held 
                                                
3 In 1868, in the UK, a consortium of loan houses and brokers created the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders. In the United States, the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council was established in 1933 
under the Roosevelt administration to protect the interests of holders of foreign bonds and to negotiate 
with governments that defaulted on their debts. See P Mauro and Y Yafeh, ‘The Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders’ (2003) IMF Working Paper, WP/03/107; MR Adamson, ‘The Failure of the Foreign 
Bondholders Protective Council Experiment, 1934-1940’ (2002) 76 The Business History Review 479. 
4 During the 1970s, bank lending to emerging market countries usually took the form of a syndicated 
loan, a club loan or a single-bank loan. Under a syndicated credit agreement, the borrowing country 
selects one or several commercial banks to act as arranger or co-arrangers against the payment of a fee. 
The arranger agrees to provide a share of the loan, prepares the terms of the syndicated credit agreement 
and sells portions of the loan to other participants. To facilitate the process of administering the loan on a 
daily basis, one bank from the syndicate is appointed as agent. Principal and interest payments are made 
by the borrower to the agent, which is responsible for their transfer to each syndicated member according 
to its share of the loan. 
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in the form of bonds. Sovereign bonds are actively traded in secondary markets and held 
by a broad community of investors. The current profile of bondholders includes many 
categories of creditors, both domestic and foreign, which range from retail to 
institutional investors (banks, investment funds, hedge funds, pension funds, and 
insurance companies), also encompassing sovereign wealth funds, central banks, the 
IMF and similar international organizations, as well as institutions like the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). Bond investors, 
however, are usually not represented in bondholders’ committees or in the Paris and 
London Clubs, and restructurings take the form of sovereign bond exchanges. 
It is clear from the above that, over the past sixty years, the features of sovereign 
debt restructurings have been shaped by the type of creditors and by the nature of the 
debt. Debt restructuring vehicles therefore change according to the category of creditors 
involved: (a) official bilateral debt is renegotiated under the Paris Club umbrella; (b) 
commercial bank debt is restructured through the so-called London Club process or 
Bank Advisory Committees; and (c) bond debt is restructured via exchange offers. 
However, while the Paris and the London Clubs developed as the preferred fora for 
the restructuring of debts owed by a State to homogeneous groups of creditors, the 
creditor structure of sovereign bonds is rather heterogeneous and a dedicate vehicle for 
restructuring is still to be devised. 
The current profile of sovereign bondholders consists in fact of a group of investors 
very diversified and complex, ranging from individuals to commercial banks and 
including institutional investors as well as public sector entities. Bondholders have 
become increasingly diverse, numerous, anonymous and difficult to coordinate. To 
further complicate a common course of action, they might have conflicting interests, 
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different incentives and bargaining power, as well as significant information 
asymmetries.  
The challenges posed by the fragmentation of bondholders are particularly 
pronounced when it comes to supranational creditors. This term is here used to 
describe international organizations (the IMF and the IBRD) and supranational 
institutions (like the ECB and the EIB) when they purchase sovereign bonds on the 
secondary market. 
The purpose of this research is to analyse the issues posed by the fragmentation of 
the bondholders’ profile and in particular by the position of supranational creditors. In 
paragraph 2, a description is provided of the ways in which the principles of ‘equality of 
treatment’ and ‘comparability of treatment’ are applied in sovereign debt restructurings. 
Paragraph 3 and 4 focus on the preferred creditor status of the IMF, WB and MDBs: 
when providing financial assistance, their preferred creditor status has rarely been 
challenged; the question is whether the same should apply when these international 
organizations act as investors in the capital markets. Paragraph 5 deals with the factual 
priority the ECB, the Eurosystem national central banks (NCBs) and the EIB enjoyed 
during the Greek debt restructuring. Paragraph 6 examines whether, for the operation of 
the pari passu clause, supranational bondholders should be assimilated to private 
investors. Paragraph 7 concludes discussing the enfranchisement of supranational 






2. Equality and comparability of treatment in sovereign debt restructurings 
 
Unlike what happens in corporate bankruptcy, the priority ranking of creditors in 
sovereign insolvency is usually determined by negotiations, the chronological sequence 
of payments and market practice, which leaves out, for example, trade debt and short-
term interbank debt. 
For what concerns the equality of treatment, the principle only applies within each 
class of creditors, which are: a) Paris Club members, b) banks negotiating through the 
process of the so-called London Club or a Bank Advisory Committee (BAC) and c) 
bondholders. 
a) Non-discrimination among Paris Club members results from the Agreed Minutes 
that, at the end of the negotiations, are signed by the creditors’ representatives, by the 
minister representing the debtor country and by the Chairman of the Club. 
The Minutes amount to a gentlemen agreement, which each government is expected 
to honour in good faith, but per se are not legally binding.5 The Agreed Minutes, in fact, 
“are signed ‘ad referendum’ by the heads of the participating delegations, who thereby 
agree to ‘recommend to their Governments… that they provide relief… on the 
following terms’”.6 To give legal effect to what has been established during the 
                                                
5 The Agreed Minutes are signed by the parties involved, but they are not ratified afterwards. This 
shields the common agreement reached within the Paris Club from being the object of debate in national 
parliaments. According to some Authors, the Agreed Minutes can be considered treaties concluded by 
using the simplified procedure. See C Holmgren, La renégociation multilatérale des dettes: le Club de 
Paris au regard du droit international (1998) 217-226. 
6 See L Rieffel, Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (2003) 91. 
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negotiations, the terms formalized in the Minutes have to be transposed in bilateral 
agreements. 
In parallel, a pullback clause ensures that if the debtor agrees better terms with its 
non-Paris Club bilateral creditors, the participating countries will declare the provisions 
set forth in the Agreed Minutes null and void. 
b) The equality of treatment is also granted to commercial banks participating in a 
BAC process. At the end of the process, the BAC and the debtor sign the term sheet - 
also called heads of terms or agreement in principle - which is submitted to all the 
members of the syndicate for approval .7 For the agreement to become valid, unanimity 
is usually required, or acceptance by banks holding at least 95 per cent of the 
outstanding debt. 
Usually a sharing clause is found in sovereign restructuring agreements for 
commercial bank debt, to prevent the debtor to give preference to any particular creditor. 
Pursuant to the clause, if a bank receives a greater payment from the obligor, it has to 
transfer the excess to the agent bank, which will redistribute the sum pro rata to each 
bank in the syndicate. 
In addition, a most favoured debt clause provides that, if another foreign currency 
debt falling due on the same date is paid sooner or offered better terms, then the 
borrower must extend the same treatment to the rescheduled debt.8 The clause is 
conceived to encourage all eligible creditors to participate to the rescheduling. However, 
certain categories of debt are excluded from the scope of the clause, such as trade debt 
                                                
7 Usually, each material element of a restructuring package has to be agreed upon by the members of 
the BAC. On this point see LC Buchheit, ‘Use of Creditor Committees in Sovereign Debt Workouts’ 
(2009) 10 (3) Business Law International, 208. 
8 See PR Wood, Principles of International Insolvency (2nd edn, 2007), par. 25-060. 
 9 
and sovereign bonds; furthermore, in order to preserve their priority, the debt owed to 
the IMF and other international organizations is exempted. 
Often, a negative pledge clause prohibits the debtor State from creating or allowing 
security interests over its assets. The purpose of the clause is to prevent the 
subordination of unsecured creditors, especially when, being in distress, the borrower 
can only raise funds by selling securities. 
c) In the case of sovereign bonds, the equality of creditors is guaranteed by the 
operation of the pari passu clause9 and other contractual provisions like the negative 
pledge and the most favoured creditor clause.10  
The pari passu is a boilerplate provision in public or private international unsecured 
debt obligations. In its more common form, the clause reads: “The bonds are unsecured 
obligations of the issuer and rank at least pari passu, without any preference amongst 
themselves, with all other outstanding, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the 
issuer, present and future”.11 
                                                
9 On the pari passu clause see in particular: LC Buchheit, JS Pam, ‘The Pari Passu Clause in 
Sovereign Debt Instruments’ (2004) 53 Emory Law Journal 869; R Olivares-Caminal, ‘To Rank Pari 
Passu or not to Rank Pari Passu: that is the Question in Sovereign Bonds’ (2009) 15 (4) Law & Business 
Review of the Americas 745-778; M Weidemaier, R Scott, M Gulati, ‘Origin Myths, Contracts, and the 
Hunt for Pari Passu’ (2013) 38 Law & Soc. Inquiry 72. 
10 These clauses are similar to the ones found in rescheduling agreements for commercial banks debt. 
For instance, a ‘rights upon future offers clause’ (RUFO) is found together with the ‘most favored 
creditor clause’ (MFCC)  in the restructured bond contracts of Argentina. 
11 PR Wood, International Loans, Bonds, Guarantees, Legal Opinions (2nd edn, 2007) par. 12-010 ff. 
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The clause establishes both equality of bonds among themselves (the so-called 
internal element) and that the bonds are equal with all other unsecured or 
unsubordinated indebtedness of the issuer (the so-called external element).12 
There are, however, two different interpretations of the pari passu. According to the 
mainstream approach, the clause only provides for the equality of legal ranking: 
bondholders are protected from legal subordination. In other words, a breach of the 
clause only arises if the debtor subordinates the protected debt through mandatory 
measures which would change the legal ranking.  
Quite differently, according to a more recent interpretation, the clause would assert 
equal payment rights and consequently provide for rateable payments on a non-
discriminatory basis: when the debtor is unable to pay all its obligations, they will be 
paid on a pro-rata basis. As a result, creditors who had accepted an exchange offer 
cannot even be paid interests unless the same percentage of payment is made on both 
principal and interest due to the other pari passu creditors (in other words, unless 
holdouts receive the same fraction of their total credit accrued at a given date). 
This interpretation was applied in a lawsuit raised against Argentina by NML Capital 
before US courts.13 The rulings provoked an earthquake on international finance and it 
                                                
12 R Olivares-Caminal, ‘The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments: Developments in 
Recent Litigation’, BIS Papers No. 72, July 2013, 123. 
13 This interpretation of the pari passu clause was adopted by Judge Thomas Griesa in the case NML 
Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012): pursuant to the 
injunction order, Argentina has to make a ‘rateable payment’ to NML Capital (a so-called vulture fund) 
whenever it pays the holders of the restructured debt. 
 11 
was observed that they might discourage participation in future debt exchange offers, 
distort incentives and make sovereign debt restructurings less predictable and orderly.14 
                                                                                                                                          
The injunction was affirmed in October 2012 by a unanimous panel of the US Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit: NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012) [2012 BL 
283459] Docket 12-105(L), 26 October 2012.  
Later on, in November 2012, the District Court issued amended injunctions with the clarifications 
requested by the Second Circuit: NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 
2012 WL 5895786 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012). 
In August 2013, the US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit affirmed the amended order: NML Capital 
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013), 23 August 2013. Par. 239 reads: ‘In its 
opinion, the district court first explained that its ‘rateable payment’ requirement meant that whenever 
Argentina pays a percentage of what is due on the Exchange Bonds, it must pay plaintiffs the same 
percentage of what is then due on the FAA Bonds. Under the express terms of the FAA, as negotiated and 
agreed to by Argentina, the amount currently due on the FAA Bonds, as a consequence of its default, is 
the outstanding principal and accrued interest. […] Thus, as the district court explained, if Argentina pays 
Exchange Bondholders 100% of what has come due on their bonds at a given time, it must also pay 
plaintiffs 100% of the roughly $1.33 billion of principal and accrued interest that they are currently due.’ 
On 16 June 2014 the US Supreme Court rejected Argentina’s appeal for a reversal of the lower courts’ 
rulings: Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital Ltd., US Supreme Court, No. 12-842, 2014 BL 165390 
(16 June 2014). 
14 See Brief for the United States of America as amicus curiae in support of the Republic of 
Argentina’s petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc (28 December 2012) filed before the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (New York) in the case NML vs. Republic of 
Argentina, case 12-105. Brief for the Republic of France as amicus curiae in support of the Republic of 
Argentina’s petition for a writ of certiorari (26 July 2013) filed before the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the case Republic of Argentina v. NML (Docket Number 12-1494). Brief for the Republic of 
France as amicus curiae in support of the Republic of Argentina’s petition for a writ of certiorari (24 
March 2014) filed before the Supreme Court of the United States in the case Republic of Argentina v. 
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To clarify the meaning of the clause, in August 2014 the International Capital Market 
Association (ICMA) published a new standard pari passu provision,15 revised in the 
light of NML, which received the endorsement of the IMF.16 The new boilerplate 
provision was drafted to ensure only equal ranking (i.e. the sovereign is prohibited from 
legally subordinating the indebtedness to other relevant debt) and making explicit that it 
does not entail the obligation to pay bondholders on a ratable basis.  
It is evident from the above that each category of creditors requests equal treatment: 
the debtor State undertakes not to offer better terms to creditors of the same class not 
taking part in the restructuring. In addition, the debtor State is requested to offer a 
comparable treatment among classes of creditors. 
Nowadays, the comparability of treatment has become one of the cornerstones of 
the Paris Club17 but, in the absence of inter-class binding agreements, it is not easily 
achievable or enforceable.  
                                                                                                                                          
NML, case 13-990. Brief of Joseph Stiglitz as amicus curiae in support of petitioner (24 March 2014) 
filed before the Supreme Court of the United States in the case Republic of Argentina v. NML, case 13-
990. See also IMF, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring - Recent Developments and Implications for the 
Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework’, 26 April 2013, 30 ff. 
15 See ICMA, “Standard Pari Passu Provision for the Terms and Conditions of Sovereign Notes”, 
August 2014, available at http://www.icmagroup.org/resources/Sovereign-Debt-Information/ (last visited 
10 January 2015).  
16 See IMF, ‘Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring’, October 2014, p. 7 ff. 
17 Philip R Wood QC gives an example of a clause: ‘In order to secure comparable treatment of its 
debt due to all its external public or private creditors, the Government of the Republic of [ ] commits 
itself to seek promptly from all its external creditors debt reorganisation arrangements on terms 
comparable to those set forth in the present Agreed Minute, while trying to avoid discrimination among 
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The debtor undertakes to seek from non-Paris Club creditors a treatment comparable 
to the one granted in the Agreed Minutes. This is understood to apply to States not 
represented in the Club, international organizations and private creditors, the only 
exception being the recognition of preferred creditor status to the IMF, the World Bank 
and regional development banks. Breaching the comparability principle would entail the 
cancellation of Paris Club debt relief. 
Besides, the Paris Club does not acknowledge the validity of the so-called reverse 
comparability principle: in fact, public creditors do not feel bound by a haircut agreed 
by the private sector.18 The rationale behind this stance is that, unlike private creditors, 
public creditors do not lend for profit purposes. Consequently, an effort made by private 
creditors cannot be a benchmark for the public sector. 
Finally, it should be recalled that these non-discrimination principles were never 
applied before World War II: at the time, commercial, political and diplomatic relations 
                                                                                                                                          
different categories of creditors. Consequently, the Government of the Republic of [. . .] commits itself to 
accord all categories of creditors and in particular creditor countries not participating in the present 
Agreed Minute, and private sector creditors treatment not more favourable than that accorded to the 
Participating Creditor Countries for credits of comparable maturity.’ (PR Wood, ‘How the Greek Debt 
Reorganisation of 2012 Changed the Rules of Sovereign Insolvency’ (2013) 14 (1) Business Law 
International 41). R. Olivares Caminal puts forward another example explicitly mentioning bondholders: 
‘In order to secure comparable treatment of its debt due to all its external public or private creditors, the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan commits itself to seek from … bond holders the 
reorganization of bonds’ (R Olivares-Caminal, Debt Restructuring (2011) 423). 
18 T Lambert, ‘Debt Restructuring Experience: the Paris Club’ (2011), p. 4, paper presented at the 
conference ‘The missing link in the international financial architecture: sovereign debt restructuring’ 
organized by Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Argentino, Buenos Aires, 7 December 2011, available 
at http://www.mecon.gov.ar/finanzas/deuda%20soberana/lambert.pdf. 
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resulted in a cobweb of preferential treatments and elaborate schemes differentiating 
among creditors and among the currencies in which the debts were to be paid.19 
The first time the foreign debt of a country was restructured collectively was in 1953 
when the Agreement on German External Debts was signed in London.20 However, 
only when the focus shifted on restoring a country’s long-term debt sustainability, the 
equality and comparability of treatment became relevant and translated into standard 
clauses. 
 
3. The preferred creditors status of international financial institutions 
Preferred creditor status is only enjoyed by the IMF, the World Bank and 
multilateral development banks (MDBs): countries borrowing from these international 
organizations are expected to grant them priority over other public or private creditors. 
                                                
19 See RA Morales, ‘Equality of Treatment of Creditors in the Restructuring of Foreign Debt’, in D 
Carreau, MN Shaw (eds), The External Debt (1995) 381 ff. 
20 One of the first application of the principle can be found in Art. 8 (‘Prohibition of Discriminatory 
Treatment’) of the Agreement on German External Debts, signed in London on 27 February 1953, which 
provides that: ‘The Federal Republic of Germany will not permit, nor will the creditor countries seek 
from the Federal Republic of Germany, either in the fulfilment of terms of settlement in accordance with 
the present Agreement and the Annexes thereto or otherwise, any discrimination or preferential treatment 
among the different categories of debts or as regards the currencies in which debts are to be paid or in any 
other respect. Differences in the treatment of different categories of debt resulting from the settlement in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Agreement and the Annexes thereto shall not be considered 
discrimination or preferential treatment’. On the London Debt Agreement see RM Buxbaum, ‘The 
London Debt Agreement of 1953 and Its Consequences’, in HE Rasmussen-Bonne, R Freer, W Lüke, W 
Weitnauer (eds), Balancing of Interests, Liber Amicorum Peter Hay zum 70. Geburtstag (2005) 55-72. 
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In the 1980s, some authors expressed the view that the privileged status of the IMF 
came from an international customary law norm.21 Others, however, contended that a 
general international law rule to this end had not arisen yet and that “decisions by some 
creditors [Paris club members] to extend de facto preferential status to IFIs […] differ 
fundamentally from a legal right of being exempt, even though the private sector has 
often acquiesced”.22  
In the context of the so-called ‘protracted arrears crisis’ of the late 1980s (1983-
1992)23, the same IMF had to acknowledge the feeble legal grounds for its preferred 
creditor status and it “urged all members, within the limits of their laws, to treat the 
Fund as a preferred creditor” (emphasis added).24 
                                                
21 D Carreau, ‘Le rééchelonnement de la dette extérieure des Etats’ (1985) 112 Journal du droit 
international 5, 15.   
22 RSJ Martha, ‘Preferred Creditor Status under International Law: The Case of the International 
Monetary Fund’ (1990) 39 Int’l and Comp L.Q. 801, at 825. 
23 By 1988, 13 countries were in protracted arrears (of six or more months) with the Fund. Arrears 
amounted to nearly 14 per cent of the outstanding IMF loans. 
24 ‘IMF Survey’, 17 October 1988, p. 326. See also Report of the Executive Board to the Interim 
Committee of the Board of Governors on Overdue Financial Obligations to the Fund, EBS/88/166, Rev. 2, 
9 September 1988, p. 3: “Executive Directors have stressed the unique position of the Fund as an 
international cooperative institution, its role in the international monetary system, the revolving nature of 
its resources, and the consequent need for all members, creditors and debtors alike, in practice, to treat the 
Fund as a preferred creditor. Accordingly, all members should accord the highest priority to the 
settlement of financial obligations to the Fund”. For a comment and the text of this document, see J M 
Boughton, Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund 1979-1989 (2001), Washington, DC, IMF, 
p. 820-21 and 832. 
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Not even treaty law is of avail. In fact, in the Articles of Agreement there is no 
explicit reference to the Fund’s preferred creditor status.25 Nonetheless, in the practice 
of the Paris Club and of the G20 countries26 the IMF is always awarded priority. It is 
almost undisputed that, when the Fund provides financial assistance to a member State, 
its claims are senior to those of all the other creditors. 
More recently, some Authors pointed out that: “the IMF plays different roles by 
wearing different ‘hats’. Among these are: (1) that of an ‘honest broker’ or arbiter 
between creditors and debtors; (2) a primary lender by means of providing financial 
assistance to countries experiencing balance of payment needs; (3) a preferred creditor 
with an interest at stake; (4) an international lender of last resort; (5) a crisis manager; 
and, (6) a standard setter. Therefore, putting the IMF claims together with commercial 
                                                
25 See K Raffer, ‘Preferred or Not Preferred: Thoughts on Priority Structures of Creditors’ (2009), 
paper prepared for discussions at the 2nd meeting of the ILA Sovereign Insolvency Study Group, 16 
October 2009, available at http://homepage.univie.ac.at/kunibert.raffer/ila-wash.pdf (last visited 10 
January 2015), as well as RSJ Martha, ‘Preferred Creditor Status under International Law’, cit., 813 ff. 
26 At the October 2011 meeting of Cannes, the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
endorsed a document entitled Principles for Cooperation between the IMF and Regional Financial 
Arrangements. This soft law instrument acknowledges the importance of cooperation between the IMF 
and RFAs to promote regional and global financial and monetary stability. The G20 Principles do not 
establish a hierarchy between the IMF and the RFAs, if not for the preferred creditor status that is 
recognized to the IMF. This is also acknowledged by the European Stability Mechanism Treaty (ESM): 
‘the ESM loans will enjoy preferred creditor status in a similar fashion to those of the IMF, while 
accepting preferred creditor status of the IMF over the ESM’ (Preamble of the ESM Treaty, n. 13). 
Therefore, under normal practice, the debtor country will first repay the IMF, then the ESM, and last its 
private creditors (A Mody, ‘Sovereign Debt and Its Restructuring Framework in the Euro Area’ (2013) 
Bruegel Working Paper 2013/05, 20-21). 
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claims in a workout would fundamentally undermine the Fund’s capacity to play those 
vital roles in future”.27  
It was also argued that, without preferred creditor status, the IMF would greatly limit 
its lending activities, especially in the case of countries struck by a debt crisis.28 In this 
sense, preferential treatment is considered fundamental to ensure that the IMF’s reserve 
assets remain risk-free. This ‘adequate safeguard’ (within the meaning of IMF Art. V, 
Section 3) reflects the global public good nature of the IMF financing, which is intended 
to restore the recipient country “external viability, thus also ensuring that the other 
creditors will have their restructured claims repaid”.29 
It should be noted that even in the context of the HIPC initiative, the IMF and the 
IDA maintained their preferred creditor status. Debt relief was in fact provided in a way 
to formally guarantee that payments to the IMF/IDA were made as they fell due. In 
practice, much of the debt relief was disbursed by a special Debt Relief Trust Fund, 
financed from IBRD income, or by special ESAF grants provided by the IMF. A portion 
of the HIPC debt was also allocated directly to member States of the IDA as part of 
                                                
27 R Olivares-Caminal, ‘The EU Architecture to Avert a Sovereign Debt Crisis’ (2011) OECD 
Journal: Financial Market Trends, Issue 2, 18. See also RM Lastra, Legal Foundations of International 
Monetary Law (2006) 491-498. 
28 S Schadler, ‘The IMF’s Preferred Creditor Status: Does It Still Make Sense after the Euro Crisis?’, 
CIGI Policy Brief n. 37, March 2014. The Author concludes: “Ultimately, the case for or against PCS for 
the IMF comes down to how members wish to maintain discipline over IMF lending. There are two 
choices: discipline through rules, that is, a clear framework specifying minimum standards for the 
credibility that IMF programs will return a country to market access, or discipline through market forces, 
that is, subjecting IMF loans to the same risks of default or restructuring as private market lending”. 
29 IMF, ‘Review of Fund Facilities: Analytical Basis for Fund Lending and Reform Options’, 6 
February 2009, 8. 
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their replenishment contributions. These funds were used to buy back or repay portions 
of the debt owed by HIPC countries to the IDA and the IMF; in the alternative, the 
Trust Fund committed to pay a portion of the future debt service owed to multilateral 
creditors as it fell due.30 
What seen for the IMF’s preferred creditor status applies also to the IBRD, IDA and 
MDBs.31 Their statutes do not contain a legal basis for preferential treatment, nor does 
general international law. Though, since they provide development financing, they are 
granted de facto priority. 
 
4. International financial institutions as bondholders: do they still enjoy preferred 
creditor status? 
This paragraph is devoted to analyse whether the IMF and the IBRD should be 
entitled to claim preferred creditor status even when they purchase government bonds 
for investment purposes.  
While the IMF has only recently started to play an active role as an investor, the 
IBRD has a long history of buying and selling securities on the international capital 
markets for investment purposes.  
                                                
30 See LF Guder, The Administration of Debt Relief by the International Financial Institutions: A 
Legal Reconstruction of the HIPC Initiative (2009) 49. See also IMF, ‘HIPC Initiative and MDRI: 
Statistical Update’, 19 December 2013.  
31  On this point see K Raffer, cit. above, and K Raffer, Debt Management for Development: 
Protection of the Poor and the Millennium Development Goals (2010), Cheltenham, 221 ff. The Author 
argues that, on the contrary, the IBRD founders wanted to subordinate the bank’s claims. 
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The Fifth Amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement (which entered into force in 
February 2011) broadened the investment mandate of the Fund.32 The purposes of the 
changes introduced were to ensure the long-term sustainability of the Fund’s finances, 
and to make it less dependent on borrowing from member States and on earnings 
deriving from its lending activities.33 
The advocates of a more radical proposal claimed that the Fund should have been 
granted the power to buy sovereign bonds on secondary markets to provide liquidity to 
countries in distress, stabilize debt markets and reduce spreads. In this way, the Fund 
would have acted as a lender of last resort, supporting countries with high debt levels 
without adding to their overall debt stock.34 This proposal, however, was set aside and 
the Fifth Amendment only introduced a new investment device. 
Under the new income model, the Fund is allowed to invest part of its resources in 
fixed-income securities and short-term deposits to generate returns exceeding the SDR 
                                                
32 In particular, the Fifth Amendment modified Art. XII, Section 6(f)(iii) of the Articles of Agreement. 
See the IMF Executive Board Resolution No. 63-3: ‘Proposed Amendment of the Articles of Agreement 
of the IMF to Expand the Investment Authority of the IMF’, 5 May 2008 in IMF, Summary Proceedings 
of the Sixty-Second Annual Meetings (2008) 209-211. On the IMF new income model see B Steinki and 
W Bergthaler, ‘Recent Reforms of the Finances of the International Monetary Fund: An Overview’ in C 
Herrmann and JP Terhechte (eds), European Yearbook of International Economic Law (2012) 3 EYIEL 
635-666; S Hagan, ‘Reforming the IMF’, in IMF, Current Developments in Monetary and Financial 
Law: Restoring Financial Stability – The Legal Response (Volume 6) (2012) 253 ff. 
33 See IMF Annual Report 2013, Appendix VI, Financial Statements, 30 April 2014, p. 13 and 16, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2013/eng/pdf/a6.pdf, accessed 10 July 2014. 
34 See in particular: A Lerrick and A Meltzer, ‘Blueprint for an International Lender of Last Resort’ 
(2003) 50 (1) Journal of Monetary Economics 289–303. 
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interest rate. More specifically, the Fund can purchase “directly in the cash markets” 
obligations issued by member States and other international financial institutions.35  
However, the prudent risk profile of the Fund enables it to invest only in: (a) 
government bonds denominated in currencies included in the SDR basket (or 
denominated in SDR); (b) bonds issued by international financial organizations; (c) 
claims on the Bank for International Settlements (BIS); and (d) short-term deposits held 
at the BIS. 
Credit risk is further minimized by restricting investments to financial instruments 
with a credit rating at least equivalent to A, based on the Standard & Poor’s rating 
scale.36 The consequence is that the Fund’s external investment managers37 will be 
compelled to sell financial instruments in their portfolio as soon as these go below the 
                                                
35 IMF, ‘Rules and Regulations for the Investment Account’, as revised by the Executive Board the 23 
January 2013, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/122812.pdf, accessed 20 July 
2014. The Investment Account (IA) of the IMF is divided in three different subaccounts (among which 
the Fixed-Income Subaccount). It holds resources transferred from the General Resources Account 
(GRA), which are to be invested to broaden the IMF’s income base. The earnings generated by the IA 
may be retained in the IA or transferred to the GRA to help meet the expenses of conducting the business 
of the IMF. 
36 If the rating threshold is breached, assets shall be divested within three months from the rating 
downgrade.  
37 The assets in the IMF Investment Account are managed by external operators with a clear 
separation of responsibilities from the IMF management (the IMF Managing Director and the Executive 
Board).  
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rating threshold. This rigidity is even likely to increase the chances of the organization 
to bear losses.38 
The IBRD has a less prudent investor profile. Pursuant to Art. IV, Section 8 (iv) of 
the Articles of Agreement, the IBRD can buy and sell such other securities as the 
Directors may deem proper for the investment by a three-fourths majority of the total 
voting power.39 All investment activities are conducted in accordance with the 
Investment Guidelines, which establish trading and operational rules, eligibility criteria 
for IBRD’s investments, as well as risk parameters relative to benchmarks. 
In its Liquid Asset Portfolio, the IBRD holds principally obligations issued or 
unconditionally guaranteed by a government of a member country, issued by an agency 
or instrumentality of a member country or by a multilateral organization.40 In this case, 
only obligations rated AA- or more are eligible for IBRD’s investment; however, if they 
are denominated in the currency of the issuing State, no rating is required. Besides, the 
IBRD can also invest in corporate and asset-backed securities, time deposits and other 
unconditional obligations of banks and financial institutions and other instruments. 
                                                
38 RSJ Martha, ‘International Organizations Sovereign Bondholders’ cit., p. 3. Besides, the World 
Bank Treasury currently manages the investment of over USD 100 billion in high-grade fixed-income 
portfolios in US dollars, Euros, Sterling and Yen for several types of institutions, including other IFIs, 
donor trust funds and central banks of its member States. 
39 The IBRD is also one of the major borrowers on the financial markets and raises most of its funds 
from the issuance of bonds (which carry an AAA rating because their repayment is guaranteed by its 
member States). 
40 See The World Bank Annual Report 2013, IBRD Management’s Discussion and Analysis, 30 June 
2014, p. 20 and 33, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2013/Resources/9304887-1377201212378/9305896-
1377544753431/IBRD_FinancialStatements.pdf, accessed 10 July 2014. 
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In light of the above, the two Bretton Woods institutions are exposed to the risk of 
losses, which is well illustrated by the Hypo Alpe Adria case. The IBRD had invested 
around €150 million in subordinated debt instruments of the Austrian Hypo Alpe Adria 
Bank International Group AG.41 In 2009, after years of high-risk project financing, 
mismanagement and corruption,42 the Austrian government nationalized the bank to 
avoid its insolvency. In August 2014, as a result of the entry into force of the Federal 
Law on the Reorganization of the Hypo Alpe Adria bank (HaaSanG)43, all its 
subordinated debt – previously guaranteed by the State of Carinthia, where the bank had 
its registered office – was written off.44 
                                                
41 Among affected investors is Aurelius Capital Management LP, the hedge (vulture) fund which 
challenged the Argentina sovereign debt restructuring in front of US courts. 
42 Several criminal investigations are undergoing. See The Wall Street Journal, ‘Untangling the Mess 
of Austrian Bank Hypo’, 28 August 2014. 
43 The Austrian Federal Law on the reorganisation of Hypo Alpe Adria Bank International AG 
(Bundesgesetz über Sanierungsmaßnahmen für die Hypo Alpe Adria Bank International AG - HaaSanG) 
was published in the Austrian Federal Legal Gazette Nr. I 51/2014 on 31 July 2014. The HaaSanG has, 
pursuant to its Section 13, become effective on 1 August 2014. The text of the Austrian Federal Law is 
available at: 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2014_I_51/BGBLA_2014_I_51.html (last 
visited 10 January 2015). See also the ECB Opinion of 29 July 2014 on reorganisation and winding-up 
measures regarding the Hypo Group Alpe Adria (CON/2014/61). Besides, the conformity of the Austrian 
legislation with Austrian constitutional law and European law has already been challenged by a large 
number of different parties. 
44 The Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA) was appointed as the competent authority to 
implement the statutory reorganization and winding-up measures foreseen by the law. With the adoption 
publication of a FMA regulation on the 7th of August 2014, certain subordinated liabilities and 
shareholder liabilities of the bank as well as most guarantees and collateral for such liabilities are 
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The IMF condemned the €890 million wipe-out of subordinated debt and urged 
Austria to reconsider it: “while designed and intended as an isolated case, the 
prospective wipe-out risks calling into question similar guarantees issued by other 
subnational bodies”.45 
According to the press, discussions were held with the Austrian authorities to exempt 
the holdings of the IBRD from the scope of the law, but to no avail. Applicable EU law 
– the Bank Recovery and Resolution directive46 – contains no reference to a bail-in 
exemption for international organizations. The issue therefore can only be solved if the 
IBRD is recognized as preferred creditor. 
Similarly, in the case of a country’s default, the issue arises over whether to shield 
supranational bondholders from a sovereign debt restructuring. 
As stated above, when providing financial assistance, the IFIs preferred creditor 
status has rarely been challenged. The question is whether the same should apply when 
the IFIs act as mere investors in the capital markets. 
  
                                                                                                                                          
extinguished. At the same time, for certain disputed liabilities the due date is deferred until a final court 
judgment is reached. The affected liabilities are listed in the FMA Regulation; its text is available at: 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2014_II_195/BGBLA_2014_II_195.pdf (last 
visited 10 January 2015). 
45 Source: IMF, Austria – 2014 Article IV Consultation Preliminary Conclusions, 1 July 2014, par. 10. 
46 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, OJ L 173, 12 June 
2014, p. 190. 
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We advocate that, when buying bonds on secondary markets, the IMF and the IBRD 
are comparable to private investors, as the speculative nature of the investment activity 
prevails over their public function. Hence, in the case of a debt restructuring or of a 
winding up of a company, they should not be treated in a more favourable way, but 
share an equal burden with any other bondholder.  
On the other hand, some argue that, when acting as investors, the IMF/IBRD are still 
pursuing their global public good objectives, since their investments are aimed at 
ensuring the proper financing of their activities in the long run. If we agreed to this view, 
the IMF/IBRD would be granted preferred creditor status and their bonds would be 
rightfully exempted from a debt restructuring. 
This is precisely what happened to the bonds held by the ECB, the Eurosystem 
NCBs and the EIB in the context of the March 2012 Greek exchange offer, even if none 
of these supranational institutions has ever been acknowledged preferred creditor status. 
As we will see, while the EIB purchased Greek sovereign bonds under its investment 
mandate,47 the ECB’s purchases were made in the exercise of its monetary policy 
mandate and in response to public interest considerations. The rationale for the ECB’s 
exemption seems to lie in the public good objectives it was pursuing. 
 
                                                
47 See Art. 21 of the Statute of the European Investment Bank (version dated 1 July 2013): ‘The Bank 
may employ any available funds which it does not immediately require to meet its obligations in the 
following ways: (a) it may invest on the money markets; (b) it may, subject to the provisions of Article 
18(2), buy and sell securities; (c) it may carry out any other financial operation linked with its objectives. 
[…]’. 
 25 
5. The exemption of the ECB, Eurosystem NCBs and the EIB from the Greek 
sovereign debt restructuring  
In May 2010, the ECB and NCBs started to make outright purchases of sovereign 
bonds issued by governments of the Euro area on the secondary market (i.e. from banks 
and at market prices). These interventions were made under the legal framework of the 
Securities Markets Programme (SMP),48 a monetary policy instrument adopted due to 
                                                
48 The SMP programme was discontinued in September 2012, when the ECB announced the 
introduction of the new Outright Monetary Transactions programme (OMT) under which secondary 
market purchases of public debt instruments will be carried out only if the sovereign concerned agrees to 
a EFSF/ESM financial reform programme and its attached conditionality. See ECB Decision of 14 May 
2010 establishing a securities markets programme (ECB/2010/5), OJ L 124/8, 20.5.2012. See also ECB, 
‘The ECB’s Non-Standard Measures – Impact and Phasing Out’ (July 2011) Monthly Bulletin 66; D 
Zandstra, ‘The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and Its Evolving Resolution’ (2011) 6 Capital Markets 
Law Journal 285-316, at 291. On the OMT, see ECB Press Release, ‘Technical Features of Outright 
Monetary Transactions’, 6 September 2012, www.ecb.int. The ECB Governing Council has not yet 
adopted a decision detailing the legal framework for the OMT programme. 
The SMP/OMT programmes were object of strong criticisms and they were challenged in front of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC). On 14 January 2014, the GFCC separated from the 
proceedings related to the ESM and to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (the so-called Fiscal Compact) the matters related to the SMP and the 
OMT programmes. The proceedings related to the SMP/OMT were stayed and a referral for a preliminary 
ruling was submitted by the GFCC (for the first time in its history) to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union asking the CJEU to assess whether the OMT programme is covered by the monetary policy 
mandate of the ECB and whether the SMP/OMT programmes are consistent with the prohibition of 
monetary financing enshrined in Art. 123 TFEU. See German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), Orders of 17 December 2013 and of 14 January 2014: BVerfG, 2 BvR 
1390/12 vom 17.12.2013, http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20131217_2bvr139012.html and 
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the exceptional circumstances that were hampering the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in the Euro area.49  
As a result of the SMP purchases, in February 2012 the ECB was the single largest 
holder of Greek sovereign bonds, with 16.3 per cent of the total, amounting to €42.7 
billion. Notably, purchases were made at a discount: spending about €40 billion for 
bonds having a face value of €55 billion.50 The Eurosystem NCBs held around 5 per 
cent of the total Greek bonds, amounting to €13.5 billion, while the EIB had invested 
for just 0.1 per cent of the total, amounting to €315 million. Their cumulative holdings 
amounted to more than 20 per cent of the total outstanding bonds.51  
During the restructuring, these supranational creditors were shielded from bearing 
any losses: in mid-February 2012, shortly before Greece launched its exchange offer, 
they swapped their ‘old’ bonds for ‘new’ bonds with identical nominal value, payment 
terms and maturity dates, but different serial numbers.52  
                                                                                                                                          
BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 vom 14.1.2014, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 105), 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20140114_2bvr272813en.html. See the special issue of the 
German Law Journal on ‘The OMT Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court’, vol. 15, n. 2, 
1 March 2014. 
49 See Recital 2 of the ECB Decision of 14 May 2010 establishing a securities markets programme 
(ECB/2010/5), OJ L 124/8, 20.5.2012. 
50 See IMF, ‘Euro Area Policies: 2012 Article IV Consultation - Selected Issues Paper’, IMF Country 
Report No. 12/182, July 2012, p. 47. 
51 J Zettelmeyer, C Trebesch, M Gulati, ‘The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy’ (2013) Peterson 
Institute for International Economics Working Paper, WP 13-8, 10. See also Morgan Stanley, ‘Trading 
After the PSI’, 8 March 2012. 
52 The new bonds with different ISIN numbers (International Securities Identification Number) were 
kept outside the remit of the Greek Bondholder Act and therefore were not involved in the application of 
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This was the only way to single out and aggregate bonds issued under different series. 
The new bonds were in fact protected from the debt swap that was carried out under the 
so-called Private Sector Involvement (PSI) and performed by means of retroactive 
collective action clauses.53 
The Greek exchange offer did not extend to bonds held by the ECB, Euro area NCBs 
and the EIB, but it did extend to retail and institutional bondholders as well as to other 
non-European sovereign bondholders and central banks.54 
 
                                                                                                                                          
retroactive CACs. See IMF, ‘Euro Area Policies: 2012 Article IV Consultation - Selected Issues Paper’, 
cit., p. 47. 
53 On 23 February 2012, the Greek Parliament introduced Law 4050/2012 on Rules on the 
modification of titles issued or guaranteed by the Greek state with the Bondholders’ agreement (published 
in Government Gazette A 36/23.02.2012 of the Hellenic Republic), by which CACs were to be 
retroactively introduced on all Greek bonds issued before 31 December 2011 (93 per cent of the 
outstanding sovereign bonds were governed by Greek law). 
Around 7.3 per cent of the outstanding Greek debt was governed by foreign law and included CACs. 
For more than half of these foreign-law bonds, holdouts were able to acquire a blocking majority 
neutralising the operation of the CACs (normally to secure a blocking position a holdout creditor needs to 
hold more than 25 per cent of the same bond issuance). They are still being serviced according to the 
original terms (see J Zettelmeyer, C Trebesch, M Gulati (2013) cit., 13-14). 
54 PR Wood (2013) cit., 34. For instance, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global had to 
suffer a huge loss after having stocked up on Greek debt (and on bonds of Portugal, Spain and Italy) and 
having started to downsize its portfolio only at the end of 2011 (data available at 
http://www.nbim.no/en/Investments/, last visited 9 September 2014). Besides, when in March 2012 the 
IMF approved a €28 billion arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Greece, its preferred 
creditor status was acknowledged and upheld by the Executive Directors; see IMF (2013), ‘Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring - Recent Developments’, cit., p. 35. 
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The exemption of supranational bondholders led to the development of a very 
unusual ladder of priorities among creditors55 and it was considered discriminatory in 
nature. 56 The result was that the claims of these European official sector institutions 
were de facto granted seniority, to the detriment of both retail and institutional investors. 
The Greek sovereign debt restructuring was the first case in which private debt holders 
were subordinated to supranational bondholders. 
While bondholders agreeing to the exchange offer received bonds maturing between 
2023 and 2042 and suffered a huge haircut (53.5 per cent on their principal), the 
maturity dates of the bonds held by the ECB and the other supranational bondholders 
remained unvaried. The ECB would in fact receive the full face value of the Greek 
bonds it had purchased at significantly below par value and it would also benefit from 
coupon payments,57 thus receiving de facto preferential creditor status. 
                                                
55 PR Wood (2013) cit., 32.  
56 According to the IIF Joint Committee on Strengthening the Framework for Sovereign Debt Crisis 
Prevention and Resolution, ‘the exclusion of the ECB holdings from the debt exchange could be 
rationalized […], but the exclusion of the official body holdings [NCBs and EIB] deviated from the 
normal principle of non-discrimination’ (IIF, ‘Report of the Joint Committee on Strengthening the 
Framework for Sovereign Debt Crisis Prevention and Restructuring’, October 2012, p. 15). See also the 
Addendum to the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring (the document is 
attached to the IIF 2012 Report, cit.), in particular paragraph 5, titled ‘Fair and Comparable Treatment of 
All Creditors’. 
57 It has to be underlined that the ECB earned huge profits from the SMP operations, not only because 
of the lower cost of ECB funding relative to the interest rate on the bonds, but above all because it bought 
the bonds at a discount to par (for about €40bn versus €55billion face value). Data from: IMF, ‘Euro Area 
Policies: 2012 Article IV Consultation - Selected Issues Paper’, cit., 47. 
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The decision to grant preferential treatment to the ECB resulted in an aggravated 
sense of grievance on the part of the disfavoured creditors and it was harshly criticized. 
On the issue it was observed that: “The larger the share of the privileged creditors 
becomes (protected against losses in case of a debt cut), the higher the default risks for 
the underprivileged (private) creditors rise”.58  
Furthermore, the fact that part of the money disbursed to Greece by the IMF and 
Euro area members was used to repay the ECB provoked a flood of indignant 
reactions.59 
Initially, the ECB argued that its exemption from the PSI was “special” and justified 
on the grounds that it had intervened on the bond markets solely for monetary policy 
purposes.60 In a second moment, however, the ECB declared that in similar situations it 
would be ready to be pari passu with private lenders.61 In addition, it committed to 
                                                
58 K Schneider, ‘Questions and Answers: Karlsruhe’s Referral for a Preliminary Ruling to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union’ (2014) 15 (2) German Law Journal 234. 
59 A first group of bonds held by the ECB matured at the end of August 2012. While struggling with 
the austerity measures and spending cuts required by the Troika, Greece had to repay €3 billion. This, 
however, was only a fraction of the €55billion face value Greek bonds held by the ECB and by 
Eurosystem NCBs. 
60 According to Mario Draghi ‘the SMP was a monetary policy instrument. So the purchases of Greek 
bonds done under that program responded to public interest policy – general policy considerations. And 
as such, they deserve protection.’ (M Draghi, President of the ECB, ‘Transcript of the Press Conference’, 
8 March 2012, available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120308.en.html). 
61 This will apply to sovereign bond purchases made via the OMT programme. Under the OMT 
programme, however, the ECB is ‘not only able to buy government bonds, but also to sell them again, 
and their valuation is based on market prices rather than on final maturity’ (Introductory statement by the 
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return any profits on its Greek bond holdings to its shareholders on the basis of their 
capital subscription (i.e. both Euro and non-Euro area NCBs, with the latter receiving a 
smaller percentage).62 
It is worth summarizing what eventually happened to the so-called SMP profits. 
In November 2012, the Euro area member States undertook to transfer on a 
segregated account established in the Bank of Greece (which has to be used exclusively 
for debt service payments and to redeem maturing bonds)63 “an amount equivalent to 
the income on the SMP portfolio accruing to their NCBs”.64  
                                                                                                                                          
ECB in the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court by Jörg Asmussen, Member of the 
Executive Board of the ECB, Karlsruhe, 11 June 2013). 
62 J Zettelmeyer, C Trebesch, M Gulati (2013) cit., 10. 
63 The Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (par. 2.5.6.1) 
required Greece to adopt measures to safeguard debt servicing and monitor cash flows, avoid diversion of 
official financing and secure a timely debt servicing (for the text of the Memorandum of Understanding 
on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, see European Commission, ‘The Second Economic 
Adjustment Programme for Greece: First Review - December 2012’, Occasional Papers 123, December 
2012, p. 189 ff.). To these ends, Law 4063/2012 (GG A’ 71) established a ‘segregated account’ in the 
Bank of Greece. Transfers to the segregated account were made conditional on the implementation by 
Greece of austerity measures and other reforms. By law, disbursements to this account are not to be used 
for purposes other than debt servicing. The Greek government also adopted legislation giving priority to 
debt service vis-à-vis other cash outflows. Moreover, all payments from the segregated account will be 
subject to ‘prior detailed reporting to the EFSF/ESM and ex-post confirmation by the account holder’ 
(IMF, ‘Greece: First and Second Reviews under the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund 
Facility’, IMF Country Report No. 13/20, January 2013, p. 183). 
64 Eurogroup Statement on Greece, 27 November 2012, available at 
http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/367646/eurogroup_statement_greece_27_november_2012.pdf, 
accessed 10 January 2015. 
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The ECB underlined that return by national governments of resources “analogous” to 
the SMP profits will be made “at their own discretion and without any implication for 
the pay-out of profits from NCBs”.65  
In July 2013, the Eurogroup approved a disbursement of €2 billion to Greece’s 
segregated account.66 A first sub-tranche of €1.5 billion was transferred by the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM)67 on 31 July 2013 and a second sub-tranche of 
€0.5 billion was paid on 17 December 2013.68  
Transfers under this scheme were made conditional “upon	a strong implementation 
by the country of the agreed reform measures in the programme period as well as in the 
post-programme surveillance period”.69 
                                                
65 ECB, Monthly Bulletin, December 2012, p. 44. 
66 Eurogroup, ‘Statement on Greece’, 8 July 2013, available at 
http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/442728/20130708-EG-Draft-statement-on-Greece-final.pdf, 
accessed 10 January 2015. Euroarea Member States receiving financial assistance by the EFSF/ESM were 
not required to participate in the scheme. 
See also European Commission, ‘The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece – Third 
Review, July 2013, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Occasional Papers 159, July 
2013 par. 103, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp159_en.pdf, accessed 
10 January 2015. 
67 The ESM was established in 2012 by Euro area Member States to provide financial assistance to 
members experiencing or threatened by financing difficulties. Latvia adopted the Euro on 1 January 2014 
and joined the ESM on 13 March 2014. 
68 See EFSF Press Release, ‘EFSF disburses €2.5 billion to Greece’, 31 July 2013 and EFSF Press 
Release, ‘EFSF Board of Directors approves €500 million disbursement to Greece’, 17 December 2013, 
available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu. 
69 Eurogroup, ‘Statement on Greece’, 27 November 2012, cit. 
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While the Troika describes the remittance of SMP profits as “additional financing 
sources”70, these transfers are more similar to conditional aid or donor contributions, 
than to financial assistance. Conditions are attached to their disbursements, but these are 
sums that do not need to be repaid and, indeed, they will never be reimbursed.71  
Besides, disbursement by the ESM72 will provide a shield against claims of breaches 
of TFEU Artt. 123 and 125.73  
                                                
70 See European Commission, ‘The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece: Third 
Review’, cit., 49. 
71 This leads to another crucial question: was the ESM given the mandate to act as a donor and grant 
member States in difficulty some sort of ‘official aid’ or rather is the ESM only competent to provide 
financial assistance to Euro area member States if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the Euro area 
as a whole and subject to strict conditionality? 
72 Contribution to the ESM is made by participating member States on the basis of the key for 
subscription by their national central banks to the ECB’s capital. See Art. 11 of the ESM Treaty and its 
Annex 1 (cfr. Art. 29 of Protocol No. 4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of 
the European Central Bank (the ESCB Statute) annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU). 
73 In fact, in the Pringle case (CJEU, Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney 
General, Case C-370/12, Judgment of 27 November 2012), the CJEU explicitly affirmed that: ‘Art. 123 is 
addressed specifically to the ECB and the central banks of the Member States. The grant of financial 
assistance by one Member State or by a group of Member States to another Member State is therefore not 
covered by that prohibition. […] even if the Member States are acting via the ESM, the Member States 
are not derogating from the prohibition laid down in Art. 123 TFEU, since that article is not addressed to 
them’ (para. 125-126).  
Moreover, for what concerns the so-called no bail out clause of Art. 125 TFEU, the CJEU affirmed 
that the granting of financial assistance by the ESM in no way implies that the ESM will assume the debts 
of the recipient State, which remains responsible to its creditors for its financial commitments (CJEU 
Pringle case, cit., para. 138-139). The only requirements for the ESM assistance to be legitimate under 
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According to the European Commission, in the period 2012-2020, Greece will 
receive from Euro area NCBs a total of about €9.3 billion stemming from their SMP 
profits accruing over time.74 In the IMF’s estimates, “subject to approval by member 
country parliaments”, the remittance of €9.3 billion will help Greece in reducing its debt 
by 4.6 per cent of GDP by 2020.75  
These likely positive outcomes, however, are only the unintended consequences of 
the de facto seniority granted to the ECB over private investors. 
In fact, the ECB, NCBs and EIB’s exemption from the PSI changed the ladder of 
priorities among bondholders: priority was given to the debt held by some public sector 
entities – the supranationals – over private bondholders (among which also some 
sovereign wealth funds). This added complexity in an already complex framework 
where creditors of a sovereign are usually not paid according to a clear hierarchy. 
In conclusion, the following can be observed. The fact that the purchases of Greek 
sovereign bonds were made by the ECB in the exercise of its monetary policy mandate 
and responding to public interest considerations might justify the unexpected priority it 
enjoyed. The same reasoning, though, is not applicable to the EIB, which bought the 
bonds for sheer investment purposes. 
                                                                                                                                          
EU law is to be indispensable for the safeguarding of the financial stability of the Euro area as a whole 
and subject to strict conditions (CJEU Pringle case, cit., para. 136). 
74 Source: European Commission, ‘The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Third 
Review – July 2013’, Occasional Papers 159, July 2013, p. 214 (Schedule A: Indicative Amounts to be 
Transferred to the Greek Government by Eurosystem National Central Banks). 
75 Source: IMF, ‘Greece: First and Second Reviews under the Extended Arrangement under the 
Extended Fund Facility’, 21 December 2012, 84 (Box 4: Measures taken to address the Greek debt 
burden). 
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6. The applicability of the pari passu clause to supranational bondholders 
For the purposes of our research, it is interesting to discuss whether, for the operation 
of the pari passu clause, supranational bondholders should be assimilated to private 
investors. 
Does the pari passu clause prevent a debtor State from treating supranationals 
differently from the other bondholders?  
As explained earlier, supranational bondholders are halfway between private 
investors pursuing pure economic interests and multilaterals pursuing their public sector 
objectives. 
Therefore, it is not easy to establish whether the argumentation used by the US 
Second Circuit Court of Appeal in the injunction order of 26 October 2012 in the case 
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina is also applicable to payments made to 
supranational bondholders. 
In NML II, the Court affirmed that the case presented no claim that payments to the 
IMF would violate the contract. Moreover, it held that “A court addressing such a claim 
in the future will have to decide whether to entertain it or whether to agree with the 
appellees that subordination of ‘obligations to commercial unsecured creditors beneath 
obligations to multilateral institutions like the IMF would not violate the Equal 
Treatment Provision [the pari passu clause] for the simple reason that commercial 
creditors never were nor could be on equal footing with the multilateral 
organizations”.76 
                                                
76 US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit affirmed the amended order: NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of 
Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013), 23 August 2013. See also US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit: 
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For what concerns the IMF lending, it can be inferred from the US Court’s reasoning 
that financial assistance provided by the Fund is inherently different from a debt 
obligation undertaken by a State by issuing government bonds. Therefore, the 
reimbursement of IMF loans will not activate the pari passu clause.77 
May a similar reasoning apply in the case the IMF, or the IBRD, are paid interest 
coupons on sovereign bonds in their investment portfolio or are reimbursed the 
principal at maturity? 
For instance, before the PSI, the ‘old’ Greek bonds did not contain a pari passu 
clause78 but, had they contained one, what would have the consequences of granting 
seniority to the ECB have been? By awarding ECB, NCBs and the EIB (to which 
interest coupons are paid and the face value of the principal is preserved) a better 
treatment, would Greece be breaching the pari passu clause?  
The ECB provided its support to Greece not by directly lending funds, but by 
purchasing government bonds also in the view of stabilizing markets and spread. 
Although the ECB’s public good purposes, it is uncertain whether the full repayment of 
the bonds held by the ECB would have triggered the pari passu or not. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012) [2012 BL 283459] Docket 12-
105(L), 26 October 2012. 
77  On this issue see also RSJ Martha, ‘International Organizations Sovereign Bondholders: An 
Unexplored Dimension of the Sovereign Debt Crisis’ (2013) 10 Manchester Journal of International 
Economic Law 2. 
78 The ‘new’ Greek rescheduled bonds, issued under English law after the PSI, includes standard 
creditor protection clauses such as the pari passu and the negative pledge. Greek-law sovereign bonds 
issued before the restructuring did not contain similar provisions (see PR Wood (2013) cit., 39).  
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7. Collective action clauses and supranational bondholders 
It is worth considering now whether supranational bondholders should be allowed to 
participate in voting under collective action clauses (CACs) regardless of their creditor 
status. 
CACs are contractual provisions allowing a supermajority of bondholders to modify 
the features of a specific bond issue, including its payment terms, making the 
amendments binding also for dissenting minorities. 
Under CACs of the first generation, bondholders were entitled to vote only issue by 
issue; one of the limitations of this solution was that sizeable bondholders were able to 
buy a blocking majority in a specific bond issue and force the debtor to full repayment 
(the so-called holdout problem). The new generation of CACs, instead, includes an 
aggregation clause by which different bond issues may be aggregated for voting and 
amendment purposes, thus enabling an across-series restructuring. 
In both cases, CACs are based on the presumption that all bondholders are to be 
treated equally and that, in principle, no distinction should be made among the various 
categories of investors.  
Only bonds owned or controlled by the issuer  or by any of its public sector 
instrumentalities are given a different treatment. In fact, some market players have 
expressed concerns that a sovereign could take advantage of majority amendment 
clauses, by buying back - either directly or through entities under its control - a 
sufficient amount of a bond issue to vote for a more favourable restructuring, to the 
detriment of the other bondholders.  
To prevent this scenario, a so-called ‘disenfranchisement provision’ is included in 
sovereign bond contracts to protect ordinary creditors, in particular retail investors, from 
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a manipulation of votes.79 Pursuant to this clause, bonds directly or indirectly in the 
hands of the issuer are deemed to be non-outstanding and may not be used to vote 
amendments or considered for the quorum.  
A disenfranchisement provision is included both in the EU CAC Model80 and in the 
recently amended ICMA Standard Aggregated CACs.81  
The question is whether supranational bondholders should be disenfranchised. The 
public policy objectives they presumably pursue - in conformity with their treaty or 
statute obligations - differ from those of either the debtor State or private bondholders. 
Provided that bondholders are not directed by the issuer’s will, their motivations are 
irrelevant and therefore also supranational bondholders should be enfranchised.82 
                                                
79 See K Drake, “Disenfranchisement in Sovereign Bonds” (2012) Duke Law Working Paper, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2007294. 
80 In 2011, the EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets started working on a standardized 
CAC to be included in new sovereign debt instruments issued by EU member States. See EFC, ‘CACs 
Common Terms of Reference’, 17 February 2012, europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cac_-
_text_model_cac.pdf, as well as EFC, Supplemental Provisions, 17 February 2012, 
europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cac_-_supplemental_provisions.pdf (last visited 10 January 2015). 
According to the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (Art. 12.3), all new euro area 
government securities with maturity above one year and issued after January 2013 should include a CAC. 
81 See ICMA, “Standard Aggregated Collective Action Clauses (CACs) for the Terms and Conditions 
of Sovereign Notes”, lett. (i) Notes controlled by the Issuer, August 2014, available at 
http://www.icmagroup.org/resources/Sovereign-Debt-Information/ (last visited 10 January 2015). See 
also IMF (2014) ‘Strengthening the Contractual Framework’, cit., p. 26 ff. 
82 C Hofmann, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring in Europe Under the New Model Collective Action 
Clauses’ (2014) 49 Texas International Law Journal 407. 
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While developing a EU CAC Model, the view was expressed that “neither an 
investor’s interests or motives, nor the predictability of an investor’s vote for or against 
a proposed modification, constitutes adequate grounds for disenfranchising an investor. 
[…] the litmus test remains: is a bondholder acting in its own interest? If so, the 
bondholder should be enfranchised […]”.83 
The final EU CAC Model – unlike the ICMA model clause – grants voting power to 
bondholders with autonomy of decision from the issuer and, in particular, to those 
which are prohibited from taking, directly or indirectly, instructions from the issuer on 
how to vote on a proposed modification.84  
It should be underlined that this provision was discussed when the SMP programme 
was in force and contains an implicit reference to the ECB and the Eurosystem NCBs.  
Since their independence is protected by the EU Treaties85, their disenfranchisement is 
not necessary.  
As for the IMF and IBRD, their willingness to preserve their preferred creditor status 
might direct them to vote against any proposed restructuring of the bonds they hold. 
Even in this case, however, they will retain complete autonomy of decision from the 
issuer and therefore, according to the actual Euro CACs rationale, they will be 
enfranchised. 
 
                                                
83 See EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, “Model Collective Action Clause 
Supplemental Explanatory Note”, 26 March 2012, available at 
http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/supplemental_explanatory_note_on_the_model_cac_-
_26_march_2012.pdf, p. 6 (last visited 10 January 2015).  
84 Section 2.7, lett. c, iii), (x) of the European Model CAC. 
85 See Article 130 TFEU and Article 7 of the ECB Statute. They do not enjoy preferred creditor status. 
